Introduction
Schooling is often considered a process of human capital accumulation (Becker, 1964) . This productive role for education motivates government involvement in school financing. But...there is a weak connection between public education expenditures and educational outputs Why? -Students are passive and resources are used poorly by educators. -Students are active and do not have proper incentives to work hard.
Introduction (continued)
Goal: Develop a model that incorporates these complementary views to study different education financing policies. Contributions:
-Demonstrate that public spending on education should be guided by considerations about students' motivation to perform. -Show how different types of government spending affect this motivation.
Intuition (continued)
Some sorts of education expenditures make this `bad' equilibrium more likely to occur and worse when it does occur.
-For example: lowering the private cost of education can increase enrollment but also increase the share of agents mimicking the skilled and decrease the overall supply of skill.
Other sorts of education expenditures make this `bad' equilibrium less likely and less onerous when it does occur.
-For example: increasing the quality of education can increase enrollment and decrease the share of agents mimicking the skilled.
The environment
Overlapping generations model with 2 period lived agents.
Homogenous population normalized to 1. Two types of human capital are present:
-Unskilled human capital is an endowment.
-This can be refined into skilled human capital.
A representative firm hires skilled and unskilled labor to produce a final consumption good. A government levies taxes and uses revenue to fund education.
The environment (continued)
Young agents can choose to undertake a one period educational opportunity (school) that is costly (tuition) and requires effort (study The old inelastically supply a unit of labor to a representative competitive firm and consume.
The technology of education.
• Schools combine education inputs per student with individual effort to produce productive skills.
• When combined with e s + e d units of effort (high effort), education yields -a degree -and z units of skilled labor.
• When combined with e d units of effort (low effort), education yields -a degree -and 0 units of skilled labor.
• Agents with no skill (with or without degree) supply one unit of unskilled labor.
The agents' problem.
• A student's lifetime utility is U = −e + βE ln c.
-e ∈ {0, e d , e s + e d } is an effort disutility.
-β is the discount factor.
-c is consumption.
-E denotes initial expectations.
• Tuition T > 0 is financed by borrowing at gross rate R.
• Budget constraints: -c = I − T R with college education.
-c = I otherwise.
The agents' problem (continued).
• Old agents can be: -skilled with a degree and skills (s),
-schooled with a degree but no skills (d),
-or unschooled without a degree and without skills (u).
• Firms observe degrees, but recognize a worker's productivity with probability θ ∈ [0, 1].
* a skilled worker earns net wage zω s . * a worker without skill earns net wage ω u .
-If unrecognized an agent earns net wage ω k .
• The private cost of education is ρω s .
The firms' problem.
• Output is produced according to
-n u is unskilled labor input.
• The firm maximizes expected profits by hiring -agents known to have z units of skill,
-agents known to 0 units of skill,
-and agents of unknown skill level.
• The firm's problem allows us to find the endogenously determined wages and show that ω u < ω k < zω s .
• Thus on average schooled workers are overcompensated and skilled are undercompensated.
Value functions.
Thus
Optimal strategies.
• An agent's strategy is a pair, (δ
0 is the probability of going to school.
-σ 0 is the (conditional) probability to exert high effort.
• Optimal effort requires
.
• Optimal education requires
Equilibrium.
We consider symmetric stationary Nash equilibria.
In equilibrium δ 0 = δ and σ 0 = σ so: • and a share δσ is skilled.
• a share δ (1 − σ) is schooled The welfare measure
• The trade-offs (when δ = Φ)
• Consider the effect of increasing θ, z or decreasing e s .
• The case of education subsidies.
-When private cost of education is high, subsidies increase welfare.
-When the private cost is lower, subsidies can reduce welfare.
